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Can law save memory? Rethinking the role of 
legal measures in collective denial, forgetting and 
remembrance
SZCZEPANIK, MARTA
This article tries to address the controversy around the progression of legal meas-
ures of national and supranational nature that aim to introduce norms of desired 
social conduct in relation to past events. For the last two decades we have been ob-
servers of an intensified and complicated dialogue between law and memory. This 
dialogue in several countries resulted in the introduction of measures intended to 
combat acts of revisionism, including the negation of crimes against humanity, in 
particular of the Holocaust, laws on the recognition of genocide, guidelines on the 
interpretation of slavery and colonialism, as well as in the establishment of days of 
remembrance. It has provoked a debate on the role that law should play in defining 
history and in shaping the narrative of collective memory. To whom does the history 
belong? What is the responsibility of a historian and of a legislator to people and 
communities? Are legal measures that impose what needs to be remembered and in 
what way justifiable as reflections of values and norms of contemporary societies, 
or rather, by framing the past so that it responds to collective expectations of the 
present, they dangerously become measures of the same order as the behaviour they 
try to address?
Revision, negation and recognition
Historical revisionism is a distortion of history and manipulation of facts so that they 
reinforce and advance a given interpretive historical view. This may include the ma-
nipulation of statistical data, forging documents or discrediting the existing ones as 
well as selective and biased interpretations and omissions. These are acts performed 
on the legacy of the past but at the same time determined by the present and directed 
towards the future. Although today the notion of revisionism connotes most often 
acts that involve crimes of the Second World War, with the extreme example being 
Holocaust denial, it was widely practiced throughout the entire 20th century and be-
fore. Authoritarian regimes eagerly followed the message of Plato’s famous quote: 
‘those who tell the stories also hold the power’ (Plato, Republic, after: Nash, 1996) and 
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S sometimes used of legal means1. For example,‘wrong books’ burned in Nazi Germany 
and in Maoist China. Totalitarian governments introduced commemorative rites that 
helped to sustain idealised narratives of a nation’s progress and strength (celebrations 
of the Great October Revolution, the Day of Victory over Fascism and International 
Worker’s Day in countries under communist rule, or anniversaries of the seizure of 
power of the National Socialist Party in Germany and the Fascist Party in Italy) and 
to reinforce the cult of the leader (public celebration of birthdays). Commemorative 
ceremonies together with symbolic material objects (such as monuments and me-
morials) and censorship best served the purpose of cultivating myths of legitimacy 
and imposing the desired interpretation of the nation’s past. Totalitarian propaganda 
referred not only to repetitive communication practices and rituals but also to delib-
erate selective management of historical data. The goal was to form a new national 
identity based on a shared past that was given ideologically coherent interpretation. 
What new regimes emerging from violent historical turmoil often left behind was an 
inglorious record of inconvenient facts that seriously challenged the official story of 
the ‘new order’, and thus needed to be erased. This particular form of revisionism that 
consists in denying the reality of war crimes or crimes against humanity is also some-
times called ‘negationism’2. In the Soviet Union for example, historical books never 
gave any account of mass forced displacements of entire populations that changed 
the ethnic map of the empire nor of the Great Famine (Ukrainian: Holodomor) of 
1930s in Ukraine, and falsely claimed that the 1940 Katyn massacre was carried out by 
Germans rather than by Soviets3. Soviet historiography, as an ideologically influenced 
methodological approach to history that served a specific political agenda, is subject 
to contemporary studies as an example of historical revisionism:
“All in all, unprecedented terror must seem necessary to ideologically motivated 
attempts to transform society massively and speedily, against its natural possibili-
ties. The accompanying falsifications took place, and on a barely credible scale, in 
every sphere. Real facts, real statistics, disappeared into the realm of fantasy. His-
tory, including the history of the Communist Party, or rather especially the history 
1 There are some very early examples of state-supported historical revisionism. Nicole Loraux  in La 
Cité divisée: L’oublie dans la mémoire d’Athènes (1997) analyses the politics of memory in Ancient 
Greece: in the period of restoration of democracy, following the dictatorship of the Thirty Tyrants, 
a law was established that prohibited any public commemoration of the grave crimes committed 
during the dictatorship; the Tyrants were also granted amnesty in 403 AD (Fronza, 2006, p. 610). 
Other examples used in this essay will refer to the history of the 20th century.
2 From the French term le négationnisme introduced by Henry Rousso in his 1991 book The Vichy 
Syndrome (Finkielkraut ed., 1998, p. 125).
3 For more information see: Ferro, M. (2003). The Use and Abuse of History: Or How the Past Is 
Taught to Children. London, New York: Routledge. Chapter 8: Aspects and variations of Soviet 
history and Chapter 10: History in profile: Poland.
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of the Communist Party, was rewritten. Unpersons4 disappeared from the official 
record. A new past, as well as new present, was imposed on the captive minds of 
the Soviet population, as was, of course, admitted when truth emerged in the late 
1980s” (Robert Conquest, 2000, p. 101).
Holocaust denial is an extreme form of negationism and consists in either de-
nying the fact that the genocide of Jews happened during World War II and was a 
deliberate act (negation of the existence of the Final Solution plan) or in minimizing 
its scale and number of the victims. Holocaust denial is commonly condemned as 
opposing historical facts and violating the dignity and memory of the victims. It is 
also sometimes referred to as the ‘Auschwitz lie’ (German Auschwitzlüge) after Thies 
Christophersen’s 1974 brochure that disputed the existence of gas chambers at the 
Auschwitz concentration camp (Levy, 2005). It is considered to be an anti-semitic 
conspiracy theory that uses arguments contradicting the reality of the Holocaust to 
present it as mystification designed to advance the interest of Jews at the expense of 
other nations. The followers of these ideas refuse however to be called ‘deniers’ and 
demand to be called ‘revisionist’, equating themselves to historians who study and 
reinterpret orthodox views on evidence, motivations, and decision-making processes 
around historical events. They therefore demand to be seen as scholars or historiog-
raphers and claim the academic status of negationism. ‘Revisionism’ as a term can, 
in fact, be used to name the normal phase of evolution in academic practice where 
commonly accepted history is re-examined and updated with newly discovered, more 
accurate information and as such can be applied in the field of Holocaust studies. 
This re-examination can shed more light on issues such as the role of particular Nazi 
leaders, Jewish responses to the persecution and reaction of populations of occupied 
countries, as well as outside occupied Europe. In contrast, in the Holocaust denial the 
re-writing of history by minimizing, ignoring and denying facts does not expand but 
contradicts what has been established by mainstream historiography5. 
Legal measures that address today the question of protection of the collective 
memory are rooted in and derive from post-war legal, political and social develop-
ments that responded to the mass atrocities committed during the war and revealed 
in the Nuremberg Trials. This record of heinous crimes, unimaginable and yet com-
mitted by mankind, constituted a legacy that forced the decision-makers of the time 
to introduce adequate preventive measures so that ‘it can never happen again’. These 
4 A term from a fictional language called ‘Newspeak’ developed in George Orwell’s novel Nineteen 
Eighty-Fourth. An ‘unperson’ is someone who has not only been killed by the state, but effectively 
erased (‘vaporised’) from existence: written out of existing books, photographs, and articles so that 
no trace of their existence could be found in the historical record. The idea is that such a person 
would be forgotten completely.
5 We can speak of a whole Holocaust denial movement that developed on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean after the end of World War II including the establishment of pseudo-scientific institutions 
such as the Institute for Historical Review or the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust. 
For more information see: Berlet, Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort, 
New York: Guilford Press, 2000 or: Poisoning the Web – Committee for Open Debate on the Holo-
caust, Anti-Defamation League, 2008.
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S developments included, among others, the establishment of the legal definition of 
the crime of genocide and its subsequent penalization in international law. It was 
largely the effect of advocacy work performed by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer of 
Jewish descent who coined the term ‘genocide’ in 1944 (Lemkin, 1944, pp. 79-95) and 
continued to campaign internationally until in 1948 the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide that entered into force in 19516. This was the beginning of the development 
of the system of international justice that enabled the international community to try 
war crimes in tribunals for former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia7, and finally led 
to the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court in 20028. These 
institutions were given a mandate that, from the beginning, went beyond the act of 
holding accountable and punishing the perpetrators. They were there to educate and 
reconstruct, even after a quarter of a century, the atrocities committed, as in the case 
of the Khmer Rouge trials:
“The chief goal is to provide justice to the Cambodian people, those who died and 
those who survived. It is hoped that fair trials will ease the burden that weighs on 
the survivors. The trials are also for the new generation – to educate Cambodia’s 
youth about the darkest chapter in our country’s history (…). By supporting and 
learning about justice, we can all contribute to the reconstruction of our society.” 
(The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 2013).
The international human rights regime and rule of law that aimed at protecting 
populations and preventing genocide were a part of the ‘never again’ pursuit. It devel-
oped in parallel with the reflection on the genesis and mechanisms of genocide. It was 
noted that there was an inherent element in all genocides – namely the denial, and 
6 Lemkin’s 1944 definition stated: “By ‚genocide’ we mean the destruction of an ethnic group (…). 
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, 
except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to 
signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations 
of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives 
of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, 
national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of 
the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such 
groups”. Although Lemkin was present at Nuremberg Trials and successfully insisted that the word 
“genocide” be included in the indictment against Nazi leadership, “genocide” was not a legal crime 
until 1948 UN Convention. Article 2. of CPPCG defined ‘genocide’ as follows: “Any of the following 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. This definition was later 
repeated in UN Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
7 Respectively: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Cambodia Tribunal (or Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia).
8 UN Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/
overview.htm. Date of access 22.09.2013.
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it needed to be taken into consideration if we wanted to comprehend its dynamics. 
Gregory H. Stanton, formerly of the US State Department and the founder of Geno-
cide Watch, has listed denial as the final stage of genocide development:
“Denial is the eighth stage that always follows a genocide9. It is among the surest 
indicators of further genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of genocide dig up 
the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the 
witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what hap-
pened on the victims” (Stanton, 1996, p. 6).
Denial is thus a defence mechanism of perpetrators hoping to avoid punishment 
in the face of the war crimes investigations pursued. But on the collective level denial 
is also a form of shared suppression, a characteristic of entire generations, induced 
in part by fear of exposing relatives and friends who were directly implicated, or of 
acknowledging witnessing scenes of genocide. It is a psychological mechanism that 
serves to avoid self-incrimination and feelings of guilt (Huttenbach, 2008, p. 306).
I believe that it is in the pursuit of overcoming the denial, understood as shared 
suppression, that one should see the intention as the primary driving force behind 
calls for an equal recognition of atrocities that were committed long before the le-
gal and academic reflection on genocide took place. In the 1990s and 2000s a series 
of retroactive memory laws were adopted in several states in an attempt to come 
to terms with the painful past. More than 20 countries recognised the massacre of 
Armenians committed by the Ottoman Empire in 1915–1923 as genocide (National 
Armenian Institute, 2013). In 2001 it was recognised by France (Loi “Arménie” of 29 
January 2001), and in the same year they passed a law recognizing the slave trade 
and slavery practised from the 15th century as crimes against humanity and requiring 
respective information be contained in history textbooks (Loi “Taubira” of 21 May 
2001). In 2007, the Spanish Congress of Deputies adopted the Historical Memory 
Law (Spanish: Ley de Memoria Histórica) in which the state recognises victims on 
both sides of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 and the subsequent dictatorship of 
General Francisco Franco, and gives rights to victims and their descendants.
At a similar time another two types of legal ‘memory instruments’ emerged in Eu-
rope. Firstly, remembrance days (‘days that invite citizens to remember’, Fronza, 2006, 
p. 609) were introduced in individual countries following the resolution adopted in 
2005 by the United Nations General Assembly, which designated January 27 as Hol-
ocaust Remembrance Day (UN General Assembly Resolution 60/7, 2005). Secondly, 
a series of measures aimed at combatting revisionism was adopted by several coun-
tries (among them Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, France, Belgium, Spain, 
9 Stanton’s eight stages of genocide include: classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organiza-
tion, polarization, reparation, extermination and denial.
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S Austria and Portugal) in the form of criminal laws against Holocaust denial10. Their 
introduction was supported by the argument that Holocaust denial can inspire vio-
lence against Jews and as their experience in the post-World War II era suggests, their 
rights are best protected in open and tolerant democracies that actively prosecute 
all forms of racial and religious hatred, including hate speech (Whine, 2008). Indict-
ments, detentions and international arrest warrants of some ‘high-profile’ Holocaust 
deniers followed and became subject of a heated debate11.
Politics and the troubled relation with the past
In the above national and international legislature we observe a progression of meas-
ures aimed at introducing norms of desired social conduct in relation to past events 
and a tendency to invoke criminal laws to protect certain aspects of collective mem-
ory. While not questioning the reality of those events, it is also important to reflect 
on the nature of this phenomenon that has become a particular signum temporis. 
Why do we need to introduce days of remembrance of the victims of the Holocaust 
after more than 60 years that the Holocaust itself took place? Is it because the actual 
witnesses of these events pass away? Why do we now have a need to legally recognize 
inhumane acts from remote history as crimes against humanity and place them in the 
post-World War II legal framework ?
Whereas in the case of the days of remembrance the imposition remains limited to 
being only an occasion to pay tribute to testimonies and experience, and this tribute, 
although useful for the collective memory, remains ‘incapable of imposing conscious 
choices in the present’ (Fronza, 2008, p. 612). The criminalization of Holocaust denial 
becomes a much more problematic issue. Firstly, it calls for a reflection on the free-
dom of speech and legitimacy of punishing ideas, even (or: in particular) in the case 
of those that are abhorrent, absurd or simply untrue. According to Noam Chomsky, 
it is the essence of the freedom of expression to allow their expression. In 1981, in the 
essay ‘His Right to Say It’ he wrote: 
“It is elementary that freedom of expression (including academic freedom) is not 
to be restricted to views of which one approves, and that it is precisely in the case 
10 For more information on legislation against Holocaust denial see: Bazyler, M. J. (2006). ‘Holocaust 
Denial Laws and Other Legislation Criminalizing Promotion of Nazism’, Yad Vashem or Fronza, E. 
(2006). ‘The punishment of negationism: The difficult dialogue between law and memory’, Vermont 
Law Review, Vol.30, 609.
11 In 2006 David Irving, the discredited historian and Nazi apologist, was sentenced by an Austri-
an court to three years in prison for denying the Holocaust and the gas chambers of Auschwitz 
(Traynor, 2006, ‘Irving jailed for denying Holocaust’, The Guardian). Another negationist and 
extreme-right publicist Siegfried Verbeke was arrested several times, including a 2005 arrest at 
Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam and subsequent extradition to Germany for trial (Prison ferme 
pour deux négationnistes, AFP, 19/06/2008).
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of views that are almost universally despised and condemned that this right must 
be most vigorously defended”. 12
Secondly, it should be seen in a wider context of the general rise of national-pop-
ulism and nationalist discourse in Europe, targeting representatives of ethnic and re-
ligious minorities, but also recent immigrants and refugees. The necessity to recur to 
the use of laws to combat revisionism is in a sense a failure of the society as a whole, a 
‘fast track’ strategy, proving the weakness and inadequacy of social institutions, such 
as the system of education.
In the case of the days of remembrance and Holocaust denial bans it is in the 
discourse on the recognition of genocides or crimes against humanity that we deal 
with complex situations involving a variety of often conflicting interests, such as the 
search for the recognition of historical truth, dignity of affected communities and 
political agendas of states and parties. It is often due to long-lasting advocacy work 
of particular groups such as minority groups or diasporas that a particular historical 
event receives international recognition. This was for example the case of the Arme-
nian genocide, where the recognition in the 1990s and 2000s by more than 20 states 
was the result of intense activity of Armenian diaspora, in particular in France and in 
the United States (Gregg, 2002, p. 5-9). For the same reasons Porajmos – the geno-
cide of Roma people has not received such recognition; due to the lack of significant 
collective memory and documentation of the genocide among the Roma. This is a 
consequence both of their oral traditions and illiteracy, wide spread poverty, social 
inequalities and discrimination as well as the culturally determined reluctance among 
Roma themselves to acknowledge victimization. There have been no conditions for 
such activism to develop (Judah, 2011, Hancock, 2005).
A state’s official position in relation to the past can become an important factor 
in international relations, especially when it becomes part of the conditionality pol-
icy of international bodies and institutions towards their members or membership 
candidates. For example, the recognition by Serbia of the country’s role in the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre of Bosnian Muslim men and boys has become an important pos-
tulate on the part of the European Union, as a necessary condition for durable recon-
ciliation and peacekeeping effect in the Balkans (Zimonjić, McDonald-Gibson, 2013). 
The issue of Armenian genocide became a highly politicized matter in countries that 
have strong political and economic ties with Turkey and have decided not to put a 
relationship, which is at the same time crucial and fragile, at stake for the sake of rec-
ognizing the Armenian genocide (National Armenian Institute, 2013). Similarly, it is 
politically very difficult to recognise the role in committed atrocities of a particular 
group or institution that is given great publicity. For example, the Roman Catholic 
Church’s role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide remains an unexplained matter twenty 
12 The conflict between ‘denial bans’ and freedom of speech is mainly a European issue. It is not sub-
ject to debate in the United States, where the First Amendment protects the freedoms of speech, 
press and association, and even the most heinous ideas are given an equal status on the ‘free mar-
ketplace of ideas’. Thus, in America hate speech is also ‘protected speech’.
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S years after the fact, and is characterised by the silence of Catholic hierarchy combined 
with the public reluctance to investigate the matter (Ndahiro, 2005).
The development of postmodern theories has also been an important factor influ-
encing the project of memory laws. While viewing history as a narrative, postmodern 
schools of thought, such as postcolonial studies, proposed a search for alternative 
visions of history (a ‘view from the periphery’) through the deconstruction of the 
dominant progress-driven, First World-dominated vision of the past. In the same 
sense, philosopher Paul Ricœur (1981) has underlined the need for a ‘decolonization 
of memory’, a liberalisation of mentality that has been itself colonized during the im-
perial age. This intellectual shift became a fertile ground for opening public debate 
over the interpretation of the history of British colonisation in North America and 
Australia and its impact on the fate of their native populations (ex. Lewy, 2004, Were 
American Indians the Victims of Genocide?). It is visible also in the shift of French 
official history policy, with the 1999 recognition of the Algerian war of independence 
(1954-1962) as an actual ‘war’, previously qualified as a ‘public order operation’. But 
this shift itself became again a political bone of contention and provoked counterac-
tion. After having adopted the law recognising slavery and the slave trade as crimes 
against humanity, France in 2005 passed an act on colonialism (Loi “Rapatriés” of 25 
february 2005) in which the French nation expresses ‘her gratitude to women and 
men who participated in the activities carried out by France in the former French 
departments in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Indochina and in the other territo-
ries previously under French sovereignty’. In the controversial Article 4., legislation 
demands that teachers and textbooks ‘acknowledge and recognize in particular the 
positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa’. The law was 
cancelled in 2006 after mass protests in French schools and a refusal on the part of 
the Algerian head of state to sign the envisioned ‘friendly treaty’ with France (Agence 
France Presse, 2005).
Freedom of history or the burden of conscience 
It was probably because of the intensity of the process of codification of memory 
that the grassroots movement against memory laws started in France. In 2005 several 
hundred French historians and other intellectuals signed an appeal to protest against 
recent legal developments in their country in the field of memorial matters. They 
expressed concerns over the politics of memory being practiced intensively in the 
French National Assembly, the inflation of lois mémorielles (memory laws) and the 
threat they might pose to the intellectual independence  of historians:
“History is not a religion. Historians accept no dogma, respect no prohibition, 
ignore every taboo.
Historical truth is different from morals. The historian’s task is not to extol or to 
blame, but to explain.
History is not the slave of current issues.
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History is not memory.
History is not a juridical issue. In a free state, neither the Parliament nor the ju-
dicial courts have the right to define historical truth. State policy, even with best 
case will, is not history policy” (2005 Liberté pour l’Histoire Appeal).
The association Liberté pour l’Histoire (“Freedom for History”) was consequently 
founded by the signatories under the chairmanship of Prof. René Rémond to support 
the principle of non-intervention of the state in historical matters. They demanded 
the withdrawal of legislation on Holocaust denial and Armenian genocide, as well as 
of the law condemning slavery as a crime against humanity claiming that such legis-
lation undermines their research work. Liberté pour l’Histoire has thus set itself the 
task of ‘winning acknowledgment for the scientific aspect of historical research and 
teaching and the task of defending historians’ freedom of expression against political 
intervention and ideological pressures of all kinds and from all sources’ (2005 Liberté 
pour l’Histoire Appeal). They later appeared on the international stage in April 2007 
to protest against a proposal for a framework-decision by the Council of the Europe-
an Union; a proposal condemning in all EU member states the ‘public defense, deni-
al or crude trivialising of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ in the 
name of the fight against racism and anti-Semitism (Chandernagor, 2008).
On both sides of the memory laws controversy there are arguments that should 
be given particular attention. On one hand it is indisputable that in the matters con-
cerned here there can be no ‘pact of forgetting’ without justice and compensation. It 
is understandable that after having been so profoundly affected by the horrors of the 
last century humanity is in pursuit of measures that could prevent them from reoc-
curring. Recognizing that the most tragic events are part of our history is necessary 
to reclaim the dignity of persons belonging to groups that were victims of genocide 
and other crimes. But on the other hand, there is a limit to measures that should be 
undertaken for that purpose. Laws that were elaborated in the aftermath of World 
War II resulted from the experience of humanity at that particular moment of history 
and from the lesson that had been learned from it; it is therefore a misuse to apply 
them to other contexts and other events. Pierre Nora (2008) makes an interesting 
point when he warns against the ‘boundless retroactivity of the law’ and systematic 
‘victimization’ of the past: 
“History is nothing but one long series of crimes against humanity. But since the 
authors of these crimes are dead, these laws neither can nor could do anything 
except pursue, in the civil or the criminal courts, the historians who study these 
periods and the teachers who teach them, by accusing them of complicity in gen-
ocide or complicity in crimes against humanity(…). [We must not] apply directly 
to all past events a judgment founded only on present-day values and standards, 
as if these values and standards did not themselves have a history but had existed 
for all eternity. Today we believe absolutely in the supremacy of individual human 
rights; this is probably just as well in some respects, but these rights themselves 
have a long history”.
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S When on the basis of existing criminal codes living perpetrators are held account-
able and punished if found guilty and victims are granted compensation, is it still 
legitimate to interfere in processes of social remembrance and forgetting?
“Criminal laws serve to demarcate the fundamental values of society. The law and 
the penalties constitute techniques of protecting what society considers worthy of 
being collectively protected. In this context, the question arises: should ‘collective 
memory’ be considered a protected interest?” (Fronza, 2008, p. 610).
It is not an easy task to separate Holocaust denial from racism, discrimination or 
xenophobia and acts that incite to violence; as present revisionist behaviour can be 
explicitly or implicitly directed towards the future, by drawing racist, discriminatory 
and xenophobic conclusions from a distorted version of history. But the denial itself 
should not be seen as a criminal offence considering that law is not there to set moral 
boundaries; a clear distinction between ethics and law is necessary, as ‘immorality 
should never be raised as the sole justification for the coercive intervention of the 
state in the life of its citizens’ (Fronza, 2008, p. 621-622)
The problem with memory laws lies in the fact that what we deal here with is a 
confusion of orders: law enters the space of memory and tries to introduce the logic 
of crime and punishment that seems incompatible with the nature of human memory 
itself. When we analyse the question of law being capable of protecting the memory 
of past events, in particular those of the most disturbing character, we should also 
pose ourselves the question of whether the law should really respond to such expec-
tations. History is the matter of facts and data, memory – of collective and individual 
experience, law – of order and punishment. And there should be as little interference 
between them as possible. Re-writing of history must be based on historical method: 
supported with historical evidence, testimonies and data; some things are not a mat-
ter of belief, political views or lobbying. In mature democracies the goal of combating 
racism and xenophobia should be accomplished through the ‘long route’ (Fronza, 
2008) of improving the quality of dialogue and the quality of education, bearing in 
mind that legal measures are not ready-made solutions to unsettling social phenom-
ena but rather measures of last resort.
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